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A B S T R A C T   
To comply with sustainability goals, many companies buy green energy to serve their energy demand. This is 
typically done by engaging in bilateral power purchase agreements (PPA) with renewable energy producers 
(REP). A PPA can be flexibly structured, but the core principle is that a buyer (company) agrees to buy future 
energy production of a seller (REP) at an agreed-upon fixed price. PPAs are financially attractive for sellers, 
providing price certainty, unlike trading in electricity markets. However, PPAs can bring quantity uncertainty for 
buyers due to the uncertainty of future green energy delivery. This uncertainty in the long-term endangers 
sustainability targets, and in the short-term complicates reliable and cost-efficient demand matching. Thus, 
multiple strategies have been used in PPAs to encourage sellers to provide accurate and good-faith predictions of 
their short-term and longer-term future production. Yet, it has been shown that REPs can have incentives to 
misreport predicted values. This has discouraged some companies from engaging in PPAs. In this paper, we first 
investigate how PPA structure and pricing can incentivize REPs to provide more reliable predictions. This shifts 
the risk of production uncertainty to REPs, increasing the chance that REPs adopt batteries. We further study how 
having batteries for REPs affects their own revenue as well as the reliability of their energy predictions for 
buyers. We use analytical and simulation approaches to propose a decision tree for a win-win PPA structure, 
which improves reliability for buyers while maintaining profitability for REPs.   
1. Introduction 
Companies with large energy consumption are under pressure to 
reduce their carbon footprints. More than half of Fortune 500 companies 
have committed a fraction of their energy demand to be served by 
renewable energy sources [1]. Most companies cannot (or prefer not to) 
install sufficiently large renewable energy generators (e.g., solar panels 
and wind turbines) themselves, due to land restrictions and other 
complexities. Instead, they commonly engage in bilateral contracts, 
called power purchase agreements (PPA), with renewable energy pro-
ducers (REP) to buy their energy production. PPAs are becoming 
increasingly popular among companies. The total energy contracted 
through PPAs increased by 40% in 2019, accounting for more than 10% 
of the overall annual new renewable energy capacity [2]. 
PPAs are used for various types of bilateral energy trading, 
depending on the types of sellers and buyers [3]. In particular, a 
renewable-based corporate PPA is a bilateral contract between an energy- 
consuming company, who commits to buy future energy generation of a 
REP for predetermined agreed-upon prices [4].1 Such a contract is 
financially attractive to REPs (as sellers), particularly to finance their 
generation facilities. This is because a PPA brings price certainty for the 
future uncertain energy generation of REPs (unlike facing uncertain 
electricity market prices). Buyers (Companies) are primarily attracted to 
PPAs to meet sustainability targets. However, the production uncer-
tainty of REPs in PPAs can bring financial and technical challenges for 
buyers [5]. Indeed, as companies continue to increase their sustain-
ability targets, production uncertainty in PPAs becomes more detri-
mental, and this has discouraged many companies from participating in 
PPAs [1]. 
The energy uncertainty that buyers are facing in PPAs endangers 
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their sustainability targets over the long term and complicates serving 
their energy demand in the short term. Buyers in PPAs need estimates of 
future energy availability from REPs to plan for the most reliable and 
economical backup procurement, such as trading in day-ahead elec-
tricity markets. Typically, sellers in PPAs must provide estimates of their 
expected available generation, perhaps by hiring forecasting consultants 
[6]. It has been observed that even in the simplest form of production 
uncertainty (On/Off), sellers might misreport their energy availability to 
buyers as a risk-sharing and revenue-maximizing strategy [7]. Thus, one 
can expect that misreporting might also exist for renewable-based 
corporate PPA with much larger consequences for buyers. To prevent 
this, buyers in PPAs are typically given the right to audit sellers at any 
time. This right of auditing acts as a lever to prevent the costly mis-
reporting behavior of REPs and to encourage more accurate prediction 
reports [6,8]. However, this might not be sufficient, especially because 
auditing is costly for buyers and it cannot happen frequently enough to 
prevent rapid and costly mismatches. Thus, it is essential to find other 
incentives for REPs to provide their best estimates of future production. 
Pricing and structural mechanisms in PPA contracts can encourage 
REPs to provide more reliable predictions. Indeed, there are many 
design options in PPAs that, if chosen properly, can attract potential 
sellers and buyers [6,8,9]. As PPA structures incorporate stricter 
mechanisms against inaccurate predictions, REPs may find storage to be 
an attractive investment decision to improve their revenue [10]. For 
buyers, storage is expected to help REPs provide more reliable pre-
dictions. These two objectives are not necessarily aligned. Thus, in the 
presence of storage, it is important to find win-win contractual solutions 
that simultaneously benefit buyers by improving energy prediction 
reliability, and REPs by improving revenue. Despite the fact that 
contractual solutions can improve energy predictions in PPAs, little is 
known about how they should be chosen, especially in the presence of 
storage. Indeed, according to PWC [5], the lack of knowledge on how to 
strategically set up a PPA is the main barrier that prevents companies 
from engaging in them. In a CDP questionnaire [1], 44% of companies 
express that they struggle with translating their targets into PPA terms. 
Inspired by this research gap, we outline a win-win contractual so-
lution for a PPA that improves prediction reliability for the buyer while 
maintaining financial attractiveness for the REP. Our contractual solu-
tion entails recommendations for PPA pricing mechanisms and struc-
tural choices. We provide a decision tree that recommends how to 
structure a PPA in a win-win fashion. In particular, in the case the REP 
owns storage, the proposed decision tree determines PPA pricing 
mechanisms and structures that encourage storage to be used in a way to 
benefit both the REP (by improving revenue) and the buyer (by 
receiving more reliable predictions). We show how other PPA pricing 
and structure choices can encourage REPs to systematically over/under- 
report their future production. 
Our work falls into the category of model-driven decision support 
systems, which are based on quantitative mathematical modelling 
accompanied by limited data/information from the system to recom-
mend the best decisions [11,12]. We study the problem using both 
simulation and formal analysis, benefiting from the strengths of each 
approach. Our work contributes to the state of the art in multiple di-
mensions. First, we focus on an under-studied feature in the PPA liter-
ature and provide a promising solution for it. To be more precise, this is 
the first study to focus on the problem of energy reliability in PPAs for 
buyers, formulating win-win contractual solutions. Second, we advance 
the literature on renewable-based PPAs by analyzing the impact of 
storage on REP behavior and how it is affected by PPA structure and 
pricing. Third, we use and extend the theory of ‘stochastic network 
calculus’ (SNC) to understand the impact of storage sizes on PPAs. Under 
some simplifying assumptions, our formal analysis shows that increasing 
storage size can improve the buyer’s utility from the PPA at a faster rate 
than it improves the seller’s utility. This implies that REPs might have 
incentives to expand their battery sizes to the extent that it is profitable 
for themselves, but possibly deteriorates value for buyers. This suggests 
that PPAs should entail limitations on storage sizes used by REPs to help 
storage be used in a win-win fashion. We also formulate such storage 
sizes under simplifying assumptions. Fourth, combining our simulation 
and analytical findings, we develop a decision tree for the pricing and 
structure of a win-win PPA structure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we review the related literature. In Section 3, we discuss the PPA 
model. We formulate how PPA pricing and mechanisms affect the re-
ported predictions and revenue of REPs without storage in Section 4 and 
with storage in Section 5. Under some simplifying assumptions, in Sec-
tion 6, we analytically study the asymptotic impact of storage sizes on 
the energy reliability for buyers and profitability for REPs. We com-
plement these findings by being more extensive and more accurate 
through simulation and numerical examples in Section 7. We provide a 
summary of implications and present our proposed decision tree for a 
win-win PPA structure in Section 8. Finally, we conclude the paper in 
Section 9. 
2. Related literature 
PPAs are among the important features of electricity markets. They 
are used for many different purposes, such as economic development, 
reducing prices, managing uncertainties in delivery, and/or prices [3]. 
Among all types of PPAs, renewable-based PPAs are increasingly 
drawing attention [6,8]. In a renewable-based PPA, the seller is a REP, 
but different entities can act as the buyer. Some studies consider a profit- 
seeking energy trader as the buyer, which buys energy from a REP with 
fixed prices and trades it in the electricity market with uncertain prices 
[13,14]. Other studies consider a corporate PPA, in which the buyer is a 
company, seeking to use green energy to serve its energy demand [15]. 
The objectives and settings of these two types of buyers (trader versus 
company) differ substantially. In this work, we focus on renewable- 
based corporate-PPAs. 
The literature on PPAs can be categorized by perspective. Most 
studies focus on the seller’s perspective (e.g., [13]) and fewer on the 
buyer’s perspective (e.g., [7,15]). In this work, we combine the buyer’s 
perspective (in terms of energy reliability) and the seller’s perspective 
(in terms of financial attractiveness) to propose a win-win PPA structure. 
Existing literature also considers a variety of decision variables. Some 
studies assume the PPA structure is given and operating/investment 
strategies are decision variables. For example, for a given PPA, Lei and 
Sandborn [13] obtain the most profitable schedules for wind turbine 
predictive maintenance operations from the seller’s standpoint. Other 
research focuses on designing features of PPAs to align with the seller’s 
or the buyer’s targets. For example, Tranberg et al. [14] provide a score- 
driven model to improve predictions of Value-At-Risk of a PPA for the 
buyer through pricing mechanisms. Our work falls in this category. 
Finally, the literature can also be classified in terms of single/multi-PPA 
scenarios. We envisage a scenario in which a company participates in 
one PPA with a REP to serve part of its energy demand. While most 
literature focuses on single PPA scenarios (e.g., [7,13]), there are also 
scenarios in which both companies and REPs engage in multiple PPAs, 
simultaneously (e.g., [16]). 
Our work is the first attempt to use the flexibility of the PPA struc-
tures to address the problem of prediction reliability of PPAs for buyers 
in a win-win fashion. To the best of our knowledge, it is also the first 
attempt to investigate how REP storage investment can affect the pre-
diction reliability for buyers, and how PPA structure can be used to 
create win-win solutions. Perhaps the closest research to our work in 
terms of setting and objectives is by Wu and Babich [7], which considers 
the unit-contingent PPA approach. They envisage an energy trading 
company as the buyer and a (non-renewable) power plant with two 
states of availability (On/Off) as the seller. Assuming asymmetric supply 
availability information, they show that the seller has an incentive to 
misreport its supply availability. While this work conceptually re-
sembles ours, there are major differences. First, only the seller knows the 
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realized energy generation. The buyer can pay to audit the seller to 
check for possible misreporting. However, in our application, the actual 
predicted value is not visible to the buyer, but the realized deliverable 
value is. Second, we use PPA pricing mechanisms as the solution, while 
they use auditing as the solution. Third, accounting for a REP (as the 
seller) with storage is an important and relevant new element in our 
work. 
Our work also relates to the literature addressing the challenges of 
selling intermittent supply in forward markets, where mismatches with 
realized values are adjusted in real-time markets. This problem exists in 
general commodity markets [17] as well as gas [18] and electricity 
markets [19]. The challenge of integrating REPs with uncertain pro-
duction into existing electricity markets has drawn significant attention 
in the research community (e.g., [20–24]). Some studies consider 
coupling renewables with natural gas power producers [25,26] or de-
mand response [27] to hedge against their uncertainty. Our work also 
relates to studies focused on using energy storage to hedge against the 
uncertainty of renewables. Energy storage can be used for multiple ap-
plications and purposes. For example, storage can be used indepen-
dently for price arbitrage (e.g., [28–30]). In addition to arbitrage, when 
storage is coupled with REPs who participate in electricity markets, it 
can also be used for hedging against production uncertainty [31]. The 
optimal bidding strategy and charging schedule of storage to maximize 
profit in such cases can be addressed with dynamic programming (e.g., 
[21,32]). Even though there are some similarities between the REP 
trading in a PPA and in electricity markets, there are major differences 
between the two. For example, in a PPA, prices in the agreement are 
predetermined, while in electricity markets there is price uncertainty 
and the possibility of price arbitrage. Moreover, the buyer in a PPA is 
known and unchanged throughout the entire PPA term, but this is not 
the case in an electricity market. These, among other fundamental dif-
ferences in the problem setting, make it infeasible to apply the literature 
on one case to the other. 
3. Power purchase agreement (PPA) model 
We envisage a renewable-based corporate-PPA in which a company 
commits to buying future energy generation of a REP. We adopt a 
classical renewable-based PPA structure [6,13]: the REP provides a 
prediction of future energy deliveries (aka forward commitment) to the 
buyer. For each unit of forward commitment, the buyer pays the REP a 
fixed “unit forward” price cd (see Appendix B for notation). Once the 
actual available energy is realized, financial adjustments will be applied. 
The REP will pay a penalty price of cs (typically larger than cd) per unit of 
energy shortage and will receive (from the buyer) a rebate of ce (typi-
cally smaller than cd) per unit of excess energy. 
Buyers need to receive these predictions at both long-term and short- 
term intervals, respectively, to ensure that they satisfy their long-term 
carbon emission reduction targets and to plan for the simplest and 
most economical set up to serve their short-term energy demand mis-
matches. By the definition of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) [10], deviation from short-term estimates of 
energy generation is called “shape risk”, and deviation from the overall 
generation at the end of PPA is called “volume risk”. Since energy pro-
curement is more costly and complicated on short notice, renewable- 
based PPAs are adopting more short-term strategies to urge REPs to 
provide short-term predictions and in good faith [6]. Indeed, short-term 
deviation (shape risk) becomes more important as companies adopt 
more ambitious sustainability targets, covering a larger share of their 
demand through PPAs. For this reason, we focus on short-term deviation 
and energy reliability consequences for companies. However, our 
analysis and results can be extended to long-term deviations as well. 
Moreover, a recent study suggests that the contract length of PPAs might 
decrease (to make it more reliable for buyers) [15], in which case the 
difference between the shape risks and volume risks will be diminished. 
Without loss of generality, we study one billing period that starts at 
time 0 and is valid till time T. At the beginning of this billing period, the 
REP is required to provide estimates of future energy generation at each 
upcoming time interval τ in the billing period. In a typical PPA, the REP 
is required to provide hourly predictions (τ = 1h) [6] since most buyers 
use the day-ahead electricity market as their energy back up to complete 
their energy demand procurement. This means that the buyer in a PPA 
needs to predict and to plan for hourly energy demand based on pre-
dictions received from the REP. We use a discrete-time model, where t is 
the time index and t = 0, 1, …, ⌈T/τ⌉. 
We denote Wt and W̃t as the actual available and the predicted values 
of the REP energy delivery at time t. The predicted value has a relative 
estimation error of ε. This is expressed as 
Wt = (1+ ε)W̃t, (1)  
where ε ≥ − 1 to ensure Wt ≥ 0. We further assume that W̃t is an un-
biased estimate, E(ε) = 0. Given W̃t , the REP reports (as the forward 
commitment to the buyer) its future energy delivery at time t to be wt. The 
REP might over/under-report its future energy delivery if it is profitable 
to do so. This can be expressed as 
wt = (1+ δt)W̃t, (2)  
where δt ≥ − 1 (to ensure wt ≥ 0) is called the quantity adjustment and 
represents the margin by which the REP adjusts its forward commitment 
with respect to its (private) predicted value to increase profit. PPAs 
should entail an upper bound δtmax on the over-commitments of REPs δt 
≤ δtmax. We refer to the optimal choice of δt that the profit-maximizing 
REP chooses as its forward behavior. The upper bound typically reflects 
the rated capacity of the renewable energy facility. We also define the 
following special case of forward behavior: 
Definition 1. True Estimated Commitment (TEC): In a PPA, we say 
that the REP provides the True Estimated Commitment (TEC) as its 
forward commitment for a future delivery time t if it matches the un-
biased predicted energy availability for that time (i.e., wt = W̃t = E[Wt ]
and δt = 0). 
Using the definitions and notation above, the total expected revenue 
of the REP for the delivery at time t, accounting for the forward 
commitment and deviations after realization, is 
Πt = cdwt − csE[[wt − Wt]+ ] + ceE[[Wt − wt]+ ], (3)  
where [x]+ = max (0,x) for any x.2 The first term in Eq. (3) corresponds 
to the forward commitment. The second and third terms, respectively, 
represent the penalty of the energy shortage and rebate of the energy 
surplus of the realized energy with respect to the forward commitment. 
Depending on the type of PPA (e.g., synthetic or physical [15]), the 
type and availability of backup energy supplies, and the ratio of the total 
demand to be served with the green energy through a certain PPA, 
companies have different tolerances to absorb the surplus energy 
beyond forward commitments. For example, if the company has the 
flexibility to take surplus energy on short notice, it might be willing to do 
so by paying small rebates (ce > 0). In contrast, if the company serves a 
large share of its demand through a PPA, there will not be much space to 
absorb the surplus unplanned energy. In this case, the company might 
choose to either reject the surplus energy entirely or take it for free. In 
both cases, there is no rebate (ce = 0). We call PPAs with no rebate and 
with a rebate, respectively, as with curtailed revenue (w-c) and without 
curtailed revenue (wo-c) agreements: 
Definition 2. With/Without curtailed revenue (w-c)/(wo-c) 
agreements: In a wo-c agreement, the buyer accepts and pays a rebate 
2 The buyer pays the entire bill 
∑
t=1
⌈T/τ⌉Πt, all at once, at the end of the billing 
period. 
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(ce > 0) for the overproduction of the REP beyond its forward commit-
ments. In a w-c agreement, the buyer chooses to either reject the surplus 
energy entirely or take it for free (ce = 0). 
For the sake of simplicity of notation, we define the energy shortage 








According to Definition 2, we have re > 0 and re = 0, respectively, in a 
wo-c agreement and a w-c agreement. No-payment for overproduction, 
implemented in w-c agreements, encourages the REP to be more greedy 
in its forward commitments. Because, if the REP under-commits, there 
will be no rebate after realization. Combining these definitions with Eq. 
(3), yields: 
Πt = cdW̃t(1+ δt − rsE[[δt − ε]+ ]+ reE[[ε − δt]+ ] ), (5)  
where re = 0 and re > 0, respectively, in a w-c and a wo-c agreement. To 
simplify notation and without loss of generality, we normalize Πt with 
respect to the average revenue of the REP in a hypothetical pay-as-you- 





Note that Rt = 0 occurs when the REP has the same revenue as in a 
pay-as-you-go scenario with the same cd. Thus, the value of Rt for a given 
cd implies how much and in what direction the production uncertainty 
risk is affecting the REP profit. In our PPA setting, the REP is the one who 
should be responsible for production uncertainty, which translates into 
revenue loss for the REP compared to the pay-as-you-go scenario (i.e., Rt 
≤ 0). The case where Rt > 0 infers that the financial consequences of 
production uncertainty are shifted more to the buyer, which is consid-
ered to be a win-lose scenario in our setting. 
We assume that the REP is risk-neutral and thus, sets the quantity 
adjustment δt in a way to maximize Rt. Depending on the estimation 
error and PPA prices, the REP might sometimes over/under-commit, if it 
helps improve Rt. Thus, three cases can happen, each of which might be 
a favorable choice for the buyer, depending on the underlying 
conditions:  
• δt < 0 (under-commitment): In this case, the forward commitment 
is below the predicted value. This, on average, leaves extra energy to 
be taken by the buyer after realization. If the buyer contracts only for 
a fraction of its total energy demand (and not all of it) in the PPA and 
leaves some margins to take extra energy in real-time at lower prices, 
δt < 0 could be a favorable REP behavior from the buyer’s point of 
view.  
• δt > 0 (over-commitment): In this case, the forward commitment 
exceeds the predicted value. Thus, on average, the buyer needs to 
provide additional supplies to serve this unexpected energy shortage. 
If the cost of energy procurement from external suppliers is less than 
the penalty prices received from the REP for energy shortage, this 
case could be a favorable case for the buyer.  
• δt = 0 (TEC): In this case, the forward commitment is equal to the 
predicted available energy (Definition 1). This case, on average, has 
the least amount of energy adjustment after realization. This is a 
favorable case when the buyer prefers to have the minimum energy 
adjustments in real-time and plans most of its energy procurement 
ahead of time. 
In the next section, we formulate REP revenue and forward behavior 
as a function of PPA pricing and structure. 
4. REPs without storage 
4.1. Formulating REP forward behavior 
The optimal forward (energy) commitment for a risk-neutral REP is 
the one that maximizes the (relative) revenue Rt. It is clear from Eq. (5) 
that the optimal forward commitment for a REP without energy storage 
is ephemeral, meaning that the optimal energy commitment at time t 
only depends on the events at that particular time and not earlier or later 
time instants. Thus, we safely drop the time index t during a single 
billing period. Combining Eqs. (5)–(6), with some manipulations, we 
can express the relative expected revenue of a REP without storage as 
below (Proof in Appendix A.1): 
Lemma 1. The relative expected revenue of a REP with quantity adjust-
ment δ is given by 
R = δ − rs
∫ δ
− 1
ℙ(ε < y)dy+ re
∫ ∞
δ
ℙ(ε > y)dy (7)  
in a wo-c agreement. In a w-c agreement, the last term in Eq. (7) is 
omitted (re = 0). The optimal quantity adjustment δ* of the REP, with 
which R in Lemma 1 is maximized (called forward behavior), is 
expressed in the following theorem (Proof in Appendix A.2): 
Theorem 1. The forward behavior of a risk-neutral REP without storage, 



















re ≤ 1 ≤ rs
− 1 1 < re ≤ rs
(8)  
where F ε is the cumulative distribution function of ε and we assume re 
≤ rs. Theorem 1 infers that increasing rs, in general, encourages the 
REP to be more conservative in its forward commitments as stated in the 
following corollary. 
Corollary 1. The optimal quantity adjustment of the REP is mono-
tonically non-increasing in rs. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward from Eq. (8). 
Inserting the optimal quantity adjustment from Theorem 1 in Lemma 
1, the optimal R can be obtained accordingly. We also consider the 
theoretical special case of a perfectly predictable REP for which ε = 0. 
Note that this is not a practical case (as REP generation always has 
uncertainty), but is used as a benchmark to study the impact of uncer-
tainty. This is characterized as follows: 
Corollary 2. The forward behavior (optimal quantity adjustment) of a 
perfectly predictable REP in either a wo-c or a w-c agreement is δ* =
δmaxI(rs < 1), which leads to R* = (1 − rs)δmaxI(rs < 1), where I(x) = 1, 
if x is true and zero, otherwise. 
Proof. The proof is immediate by setting ε = 0 in Eq. (5) and 
maximizing for δ, when δ ≤ δmax. Comparing Theorem 1 with Corollary 2 
shows that the forward behavior of the REP is not affected by production 
uncertainty, if rs < 1. However, this is no loner the case, when rs ≥ 1. If rs 
≥ 1, for a perfectly predictable REP, we will have δ* = R* = 0. Thus, in 
this case, the values of δ* and R* for a REP with uncertainty reflect the 
impact of production uncertainty on each of them. 
4.2. Visualizing and understanding PPA price zones 
In this section, we visualize the results of Lemma 1, Theorem 1, and 
Corollary 2 to get more insights on how PPA structure and pricing 
impact the revenue and forward behavior of REPs. To make the visu-
alizations more tractable in this section, we assume that fε is symmetric 
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over ε = 0 (hence, − 1 ≤ ε ≤ 1). We show later, in the numerical ex-
amples, that removing this simplifying symmetric assumption does not 
change the results noticeably for reasonable estimation errors. We 
further set δmax = 1 in this section, for the sake of simplicity of 
visualizations. 
Given that fε is symmetric and according to Eq. (8), TEC (i.e., δ* = 0) 
occurs when rs = 2 and rs = 2 − re, respectively, for a w-c and a wo-c 
agreement. Moreover, given that both ε and δ are limited to the range 
of [− 1,1], the optimal quantity adjustment when rs → ∞ converges to 
− 1 for both PPA structures (w-c and wo-c). These observations are 
illustrated in Fig. 1b. In this graph, we indicate the pattern of a pre-
dictable REP with a solid ‘line’ and that of a REP with uncertainty with a 
dotted line. Solid ‘points’ indicate distribution-independent values. 
We can also study the pattern of the optimal R as a function of rs. 
From Lemma 1, we know that R is monotonically non-increasing in rs; 
and so is R*. For any rs < 1 due to the symmetric property of fε and the 
fact that δ, ε ∈ [− 1,1], the optimal R for both market structures reduces 
to 1 − rs. Combining all of the above observations, we can illustrate R* 
versus rs as in Fig. 1a. As shown in Fig. 1, comparing a perfectly pre-
dictable REP with a REP with uncertainty, we can identify three price 
zones, based on rs and re:  
• Zone 1: (rs ≤ 1): In this zone, production uncertainty does not affect 
the forward behavior. The REP with or without uncertainty over- 
commits to the maximum possible value δmax (here, δmax = 1). Its 
relative revenue is positive (R* > 0) and linearly decreasing in rs. 
• Zone 2: (wo-c: 1 ≤ rs ≤ 2 − re, w-c: 1 ≤ rs ≤ 2): In this zone, pro-
duction uncertainty leads to over-commitment (δ* > 0 vs. δ* = 0) 
and revenue loss (R* ≤ 0 vs. R* = 0).  
• Zone 3: (wo-c: rs ≥ 2 − re, w-c: rs ≥ 2): In this zone, production 
uncertainty leads to under-commitment (δ* < 0 vs. δ* = 0) and 
revenue loss (R* ≤ 0 vs. R* = 0). 
In summary, Zone 1 is a win-lose PPA pricing zone in which the REP 
is the winner. In Zone-1 the REP gains more revenue than in a pay-as- 
you-go scenario (R* > 0), which means the uncertainty risk is shifted 
to the buyer. Moreover, the reported prediction by the REP (δ* = 1) is 
entirely unreliable/unrealistic for the buyer. A win-win PPA structure 
can happen in either Zone 2 or Zone 3, depending on the preferences of 
the buyer in terms of the target value of δ*. In particular, if the buyer 
favors TEC (δ* = 0), the PPA price ratio should be at the border between 
Zone 2 and Zone 3 (i.e., wo-c: rs = 2 − re, w-c: rs = 2)) for a win-win PPA 
structure. This can be generalized to include other target values of δ*: In 
the absence of storage, the PPA can be set up in a way that the REP is 
incentivized to behave in favor of the buyer. In this paper, such a price 
ratio is referred to as the optimal PPA price ratio in a storage-less sce-
nario, denoted by p* and defined below: 
Definition 3. Optimal price ratio in a storage-less scenario (p*): In 
a PPA, suppose that the buyer desires that the REP quantity adjustment 
to be δ*. Then, the corresponding PPA price setting p* is any pair (rs, re) 
that incentivizes the REP to optimally choose the desired quantity 
adjustment δ*. For example, in the case that TEC (i.e., δ* = 0) is 
favorable to the buyer, the optimal price setting p* is any pair (rs, re) that 
satisfies rs + re = 2 and rs = 2, respectively, in a wo-c and a w-c 
agreement. 
We observe that REP forward behavior (δ*) and relative revenue (R*) 
do not depend on the absolute values of prices such as cd, cs, and ce, but 
rather on their ratios rs and re. However, REP absolute revenue (Π) 
linearly scales with the absolute value of fixed price cd. Thus, if the REP 
does not find the revenue R* corresponding to a p* value sufficiently 
attractive, cd can be used as an extra lever to keep both the REP and the 
buyer happy, accounting for all energy reliability and profitability 
concerns. 
In this section, we assumed that the REP does not own storage. 
However, storage can be used to increase predictability and could 
thereby diminish REP over/under-commitment. In the next section, we 
explore the circumstances in which adding a battery to the REP en-
courages its forward commitments to be closer to TEC. Additionally, we 
investigate how PPA pricing and structure should be set up in a win-win 
manner if the REP owns battery storage. 
5. REPs with battery storage 
Suppose that the REP in a PPA owns a battery and uses it to improve 
its profit. The optimal operating strategy of the storage is static and is as 
illustrated in Fig. 2a and elaborated below. The available realized en-
ergy Wt is primarily used to account for the forward energy commitment 
wt. Denote Ed, t the part of realized energy, which is used to serve the 
forward commitment, i.e., Ed, t = min (wt,Wt). The leftover available 
energy is Ei, t = [Wt − wt]+, which is primarily stored in the battery. 
However, the battery might not have enough space to store Ei, t or part of 
it. Denote bt and B, respectively, the energy content (at time t) and the 
total battery capacity. Thus, the energy to be stored in the battery at time 
t, denoted by Ec, t, is. 
Ec,t = min
(
DB − bt− 1,E
ch
, ηch[Wt − wt]+
)
(9)  
where Ech is the maximum charging rate of the battery within one time 
unit, D is the depth of discharge which is the fraction of the battery that 
is recommended (by the manufacturer) to be used to enhance its life-
time, and ηch ≤ 1 is the charging efficiency. The rest of the surplus energy 
that cannot be taken by the battery, denoted by Ee, t, given by 
Ee,t = Ei,t − Ec,t
/
ηch (10)  
is taken by the buyer with paying ce per unit of energy in a wo-c 
agreement and with no extra payment in a w-c agreement. To serve 
the forward commitment, the primary source is the available energy Ed, 
t. If not sufficient, the second priority is using the energy stored in the 





ηdc ,Edc, bt− 1
)
(11)  
where Edc is the maximum energy that can be discharged in one time 
unit and ηdc ≤ 1 is the discharging efficiency. If there is not enough 
energy in the battery, the rest of the energy mismatch Es, t, given by 
Es,t = wt − Ed,t − ηdcEb,t (12)  
is the energy shortage that the REP needs to pay for (cs per unit) as a 
penalty. We can also express bt in terms of wt, Wt, and bt− 1 by the 
following recursive equation (see Fig. 2a): 
bt = Ec,t − Eb,t + bt− 1. (13) 
The cost of using batteries for REPs is modeled as the levelized cost of 
storage (LCOS) cb, defined as the cost of withdrawing one unit of energy 





Thus, the expected revenue of the REP with a battery in a wo-c 
agreement is given by 













3 Batteries live for a certain number of full charging-discharging cycles. 
Denote N the cycle life of a battery of size B and depth-of-discharge D. This 
means that a battery of size B (Wh) can have a total energy flux of NBD 
throughout its lifetime. Therefore, if the total cost (including investment and 
operation) of the battery in its lifetime is $K per energy capacity unit (Wh), the 
levelized cost per unit of stored energy (Wh) is, cb = KBNBD =
K
ND. 
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For a w-c agreement, ce = 0, which means that the last term in Eq. 
(15) must be dropped. 
The second term in Eq. (15) is creating a time correlation and 
memory. To be more precise, the battery energy content bt is recursively 
dependent on bt− 1. Thus, revenue maximization is no longer ephemeral 
in the presence of a battery. As a result, analytically computing the 
optimal forward commitments in the case that the REP owns a battery is 
much more challenging. 
6. Analyzing the impact of storage sizes 
In this section, we provide some analytical insights on how storage 
sizing can impact REP forward behavior and revenue. We use the theory 
of ‘stochastic network calculus’ (SNC), which is shown to be a great 
stochastic modelling approach for energy applications (compared to 
other most common stochastic modelings in this context), being robust 
to uncertainties [33]. 
In this section (only), for the sake of tractability of derivations, we 
make some simplifying assumptions (as described below). Note that the 
target of this section is only to provide some general (albeit concrete) 
understanding of the impact of storage sizes on PPAs. Accounting for all 
details makes the derivations non-tractable, and it is not expected to 
dramatically change the conclusions on the asymptotic derivations in 
this section (as also observed by accurate numerical examples in the next 
section). Providing more comprehensive analysis and considering all 
cases are deferred to Section 7, where we use simulation to account for 
all these additional complexities.  
• The simplified setting for the analytical approach: In this section, we 
assume the more likely favorable scenario for companies in PPAs: 
The REP is incentivized to under-commit in a w-c agreement, in 
which the buyer agrees to either reject the surplus unreported energy 
in real-time or take it for free. In this scenario, the buyer favors the 
pricing strategies to be in Zone 3. We assume that the REP owns an 
ideal storage (or equivalently, a battery with no imperfection), 
meaning that D = 1, Ech = Edc = ∞ and ηch = ηdc = 1. We make a 
simplifying assumption that the estimated renewable energy at any 
time t is time-independent during the billing period (i.e., W̃t = W̃). 
Furthermore, the estimation errors εt for any time t are iid random 
variables with double exponential distribution (Eq. (21)), where, 
Wt = W̃(1+εt). The iid assumption of the errors infers that renew-
able energy is assumed to be approximated by a stationary process 
for the time horizon under study. We disregard truncating the dis-
tribution on the boundaries.4 
To formulate R, we map the problem of the energy content of an ideal 
storage device to the problem of buffer content in data networks. This 
mapping, illustrated in Fig. 2b, has been recently used in other energy 
applications to formulate other energy metrics ([34,35]). In this anal-
ogy, an ideal storage device of size B to store energy is mapped to a data 
buffer of size K to store data. The input data traffic to this buffer at any 
time t is At and a total amount of St data units from the buffer can be 
processed (served) at time t. The data that cannot be served at the time of 
arrival must be stored in the buffer to be served later. The buffer content 
denoted by qt at time t can be expressed by 
Fig. 1. The impact of PPA structure and pricing on R* and δ*. The solid line is a perfectly predictable REP and the dotted line is a REP with uncertain energy 
generation. The solid points are independent of fε. In this figure, we assume δmax = 1 and fε is symmetric over 0. 
Fig. 2. A REP with a battery storage, participating in a PPA.  
4 Those tails do not impact the results considerably as was also observed in 
Section 7. 
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qt = min(K, [qt− 1 + At − St]+ ) (16) 
This can be mapped to the storage deficit state of charge btd, which is 
the unused capacity of the storage at any time t. Under the setting of this 





wt − Wt + bdt− 1
]+ ) (17) 
Comparing the energy deficit formulation in Eq. (17) with buffer 
content formulation in Eq. (16), we can map the storage size B to the 
buffer size K, the energy deficit bd to the buffer content q, the forward 
commitment w to the input traffic A, and the available energy W to the 
service rate S. Using this mapping, for large battery sizes, R is formulated 
below (proof in Appendix A.3): 
Theorem 2. Under the settings described in Section 6, the asymptotic value 
of R (when B is large) for a REP with quantity adjustment δ < 0 is 
approximately5: 
R = δ −





eλδ , (18)  
where B = B
W̃ 
is the battery size in terms of the number of time units the 
battery can store the available energy and θ = − 2λ2δ2+λ2δ2. Note, however, 
that LCOS should satisfy the following general necessary condition of 
storage profitability to be used by the REP (proof in Appendix A.4): 
Lemma 2. A necessary condition for storage to be profitable for the 
REP in w-c and wo-c agreements are, respectively, rb ≤ rs and rb ≤ rs − re. 
Optimizing the closed-form formulation of R from Theorem 2 over δ, 
Theorem 3 formulates the forward behavior of a REP with an ideal 
storage system (proof in Appendix A.5). 
Theorem 3. Under the settings described in Section 6, the asymptotic 
optimal quantity adjustment of a REP with an ideal storage system of size B, 










where W is the Lambert W function. To effectively design a PPA, in 
which the REP owns storage, we should know how increasing the stor-
age size affects the REP revenue and forward behavior. These are needed 
to, respectively, project the REP incentives on investing in storage and to 
know how the storage size transforms REP forward behavior. This is 
presented below (proof in Appendix A.6). 
Corollary 3. Under the settings described in Section 6 and assuming 
that the necessary condition for profitability in Lemma 2 holds (i.e., rb <
rs), both δ* and R* are monotonically non-decreasing in the storage size, 
respectively, varying in the range of [δmin,0] and [Rmin,Rmax], starting 
from their lower bounds (when B = 0), converging to the upper bounds 
























λ , and Rmax = −
rb
2λ. 
Based on Corollary 3, Rmax is the best that can be achieved by adding 
storage. Corollary 3 also shows that adding storage to REPs in Zone 3, 
incites them to behave arbitrarily close to TEC. According to Corollary 3, 











) as the storage size 
increases. The faster rate of improvement in δ* than in R* is also 
observed in Section 7. 
We examine the accuracy of R in Theorem 2, δ* in Theorem 3, and 
validity of Corollary 3, by a comparison with simulation results. Denote 
δmin and δT3, respectively, the optimal δ in a storage-less scenario (from 
Corollary 3) and the optimal asymptotic δ when B is large (from Theo-
rem 3). With this notation and the fact that δ* is monotonically non- 
decreasing in B, for any B we have δ* ≥ max (δmin,δT3), where the 
inequality turns to equality for B = 0 and B→∞. Similarly, we have R* 
≥ max (Rmin,RT2), where Rmin is the optimal R when B = 0 (formulated 
in Corollary 3) and RT2 is the optimal R when B→∞, obtained by 
replacing δT3 in Theorem 2. Moreover, the inequality (R* ≥ max (Rmin, 
RT2)) turns to equality for B = 0 and B→∞. 
We compare these theoretical results with simulation in Fig. 3 for λ 
= 5, rs = 3, and rb = 0.5. The curves denoted by ‘Analysis’ in Fig. 3a and 
Fig. 3b are, respectively, max(Rmin,RT2) for R* and max(δmin,δT4) for δ*. 
Fig. 3 shows that the theoretical results for B = 0 and B→∞ (and even 
for medium values of B) for both R* and δ* are highly accurate. Please 
note that the values of δ* and R* from Theorem 3 and Theorem 2 are 
asymptotic results, supposed to be accurate when B is large and yet we 
observe high accuracy with medium values of B in Fig. 3. 
According to Section 3, a buyer that has some margins to take surplus 
unplanned renewable energy with zero or little rebates prefers that the 
REP under-commits with some target value of δ < 0.6 To align the REP 
forward behavior accordingly, when the REP uses storage, the results of 
this section suggest that the storage size must be restricted. This is 
because the REP revenue improvement (as storage size increases) grows 
at a slower rate than changing its forward behavior (see Corollary 3). 
Thus, there is a point after which increasing storage size still helps 
improve REP revenue, but δ exceeds and diverges from the buyer’s 
target δ. In such scenarios, PPA should entail limitations on the 
maximum allowable storage size that the REP can use, to align the REP 
forward behavior with the buyer’s target δ. 
Given a target forward behavior δ < 0, the maximum storage size 
allowed for the REP should be a function of PPA prices. Below, we 
formulate such a storage size as a by-product of Theorem 3 (proof in 
Appendix A.7). 
Corollary 4. Under the settings described in Section 6, the optimal storage 

































where W− 1 is the negative branch of the Lambert W function. Cor-
ollary 4 suggests that there should be some additional terms in PPAs on 
storage sizes when REPs use storage. For example, Eq. (20) can be served 
as the maximum allowable storage size to keep the REP forward 
behavior below a target value δ. 
7. Numerical examples 
We assume that an energy-consuming company engages in a PPA 
with a REP who owns a solar PV farm with a capacity of 5 MW. Ac-
cording to the PPA, the REP should provide hourly predictions for future 
delivery time and applies financial adjustments (as discussed in Section 
3) after realization. We use one year (2018) of the solar power 
5 This is originally a martingale bound which is shown to be tight enough to 
be used as an approximation [36]. 
6 The buyer’s target δ < 0 depends on PPA prices, the availability, and cost of 
external energy sources. 
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production data set from a field in the United States with hourly reso-
lution and we linearly scale that data set, resembling a solar PV farm 
with a capacity of 5 MW. We assume that the REP has an estimation of 
the available energy at a future time slot with an exponential tail-bound 
estimation error with parameter λ. To be more precise, the relative 




e− λ|x| (21)  
which is truncated to be always x ≥ − 1, ensuring that actual available 
energy is non-negative.7 The REP might also own a Li-ion battery stor-
age. The battery size, denoted by B, is represented in terms of the 
number of hours the battery can store the long-term average energy 




T for a large T). The other physical 
properties of the Li-ion battery are set to be ηch = ηdc = 0.95, Ech = B, 
Edc = B, and D = 0.8. We study the problem from multiple different 
angles as described in the following subsections. Unless otherwise 
stated, in this sections, we set λ = 2, rb = 0.5 and re = 0.8. Please note 
that with this value of re = 0.8, Zone 2 is characterized as 1 ≤ rs ≤ 1.2 and 
1 ≤ rs ≤ 2, respectively, for a wo-c and a w-c agreement. Similarly, Zone 
3, is characterized as rs ≥ 1.2 and rs ≥ 2, respectively, for a wo-c and a w- 
c agreement. Zone 1 is characterized as rs ≤ 1 for both w-c and wo-c 
agreements. 
7.1. The impact of PPA structure and pricing 
Fig. 4 illustrates the optimal R and δ as a function of energy shortage 
price ratio rs. We compare a storage-less scenario (B = 0) with a battery- 
equipped scenario (B = 5H). Multiple observations can be made from 
Fig. 4 on the forward behavior and the profitability of REPs. 
For the special case of a storage-less scenario (B = 0), Fig. 4 verifies 
the theoretical results on the general trends of R* ad δ* in Section 4, 
which are illustrated in Fig. 1. Note, however, that in this simulation, we 
have a non-symmetric estimation error, whereas a symmetric one was 
assumed in the theoretical results in Section 4. This shows that without 
the symmetric assumption, the results in Section 4 do not change 
dramatically. In particular, corroborating the theoretical results in 
Section 4, in a storage-less scenario, TEC (δ* = 0) is happening at the 
border of Zone 2 and Zone 3, which is rs = 1.2 and rs = 2, respectively, 
for a wo-c and a w-c agreement. 
Comparing the storage-less scenario in a w-c agreement with that in a 
wo-c agreement (‘B = 0,w − c’ and ‘B = 0,wo − c’) in Fig. 4, shows that 
not paying for surplus energy, as in a w-c agreement, leads to a sub-
stantial revenue loss for the REP and encourages it to be more greedy in 
its forward commitments in both Zones 2 and 3. Though, it has no 
noticeable impact on either profitability or forward behavior in Zone 1. 
The impact of no-payment for surplus energy on both revenue and for-
ward behavior becomes more pronounced as rs increases. 
Fig. 4a shows that adding a battery can compensate (to a good 
extent) the REP revenue loss due to uncertainty in both wo-c and w-c 
agreements, with a much more pronounced impact in a w-c agreement. 
In terms of REP forward behavior, from Fig. 4b, we observe that adding a 
battery has different effects in a w-c agreement, depending on the PPA 
price zone. In Zone 2, adding a battery encourages the REP to be less 
greedy in its forward commitments.8 This means that with no payment 
for surplus energy, adding a battery to the REP always encourages REP 
forward behavior to be closer to TEC. Comparing the REP revenue and 
bidding strategies in a w-c with and without storage in Zone 3, reveals 
that adding storage encourages the REP forward behavior to move to-
wards TEC at a faster rate than its impact on the REP revenue gain 
(compare Fig. 4a and b). This corroborates the analytical results in 
Section 6 and Corollary 3. 
7.2. The impact of the battery size 
In Fig. 5, we examine the impact of battery sizes on the REP behavior 
and revenue. We set rs = 1.1 and rs = 3, representing operating points in 
Zone 2 and Zone 3, respectively. We exclude the less interesting case of 
Zone 1 in this example, because this zone leads to a win-lose PPA 
structure (as shown in Section 4.2). We vary the battery size B to observe 
its impact on R and δ and discuss some of those observations below. 
In Zone 2 (here, rs = 1.1) adding a battery has a different impact on 
quantity adjustments in a w-c agreement compared to a wo-c agreement 
(according to Fig. 5b): Adding a battery to the REP in Zone 2 in a w-c 
agreement, encourages the REP to be less greedy on its forward com-
mitments (closer to TEC). In contrast, adding a battery to the REP in 
Zone 2 in a wo-c agreement encourages it to be more greedy (deviating 
from TEC). Please note that as the battery size increases, the optimal 
quantity adjustment increases in a wo-c agreement and decreases in a w- 
c agreement; for large enough battery sizes they converge to each other. 
Fig. 5a shows that the impact of adding batteries on improving REP 
revenue is not significant in Zone 2. 
In Zone 3 (here, rs = 3) and in the absence of batteries (B = 0), the w- 
c structure helps prevent under-commitment and encourages the for-
ward behavior to be closer to TEC, but leads to a substantial revenue loss 
Fig. 3. Comparing analytical results with simulation (λ = 5, rs = 3, rb = 0.5). As expected, the ‘Analysis’ is accurate when B = 0 and B→∞. For moderate B, still high 
accuracy is observed. 
7 With this assumption, we will not have a symmetric distribution. However, 
the results of this section still accurately resemble the general behavior 
sketched in Section 4.2 8 REP forward behavior in Zone 2 is much more visible in Section 7.2. 
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if the REP does not have a battery. Fig. 5a shows that adding a battery 
extremely helps improve the REP revenue in a w-c agreement. Batteries 
also improve the revenue of the REP in a wo-c agreement in Zone 3, but 
the additional revenue is not as considerable as in a w-c agreement. 
Fig. 5b shows that the impact of the battery on improving the REP for-
ward behavior (from the buyer’s point of view) in Zone 3 is even larger 
than its impact on REP revenue improvement (compare it with Fig. 5a). 
As the battery size increases, the additional improvement in terms of 
quantity adjustment converges faster to its saturated value than the 
improvement in revenue. Thus, the REP might have an incentive to 
invest in larger batteries to gain in revenue, but this does not help the 
buyer. 
8. Summary of implications 
The buyer in a PPA might prefer that the REP under-commits, over- 
commits, or chooses TEC, depending on the cost and complexities of 
handling surplus or shortage. PPA prices and structure, if chosen prop-
erly, can incentivize the REP to behave according to the buyer’s 
preferences. Designing such a win-win PPA structure should also ac-
count for the existence and size of the REP battery and its impact on the 
buyer and the REP. Accordingly and based on our earlier findings, we 
summarize the impact of batteries on REP revenue and behavior in 
Table 1. In Zone 1, batteries do not have a noticeable impact on either 
the REP revenue or the REP behavior. In Zone 2, adding batteries slightly 
improves the revenue of the REP in both w-c and wo-c agreements. The 
impact of batteries on quantity adjustments of the REP is stronger and in 
opposite directions for a w-c and a wo-c agreement. In a w-c agreement, 
batteries help steer the REP forward behavior towards TEC. In contrast, 
Fig. 4. R* (a: left) and δ* (b: right) as functions of energy shortage price ratio rs with (B = 5H) and without a battery (B = 0) in both w-c and wo-c agreements.  
Fig. 5. R* (a: left) and δ* (b: right) as functions of battery size B with energy shortage price ratios rs = 1.1,3 in both w-c and wo-c agreements.  
Table 1 
Effects of adding batteries on (1) the REP (seller) revenue and (2) the company 
(buyer) quantity adjustment.   
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
w-c wo-c w-c wo-c w-c wo-c 
REP (Seller) ~0 ~0 + + ++ ++
Company (Buyer) ~0 ~0 ++ – +++ +++
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in a wo-c agreement, batteries encourage the REP to become more 
greedy and deviate farther from TEC. Finally, Zone 3 is the only zone in 
which batteries significantly improve the REP revenue as well as the 
quantity adjustment for both w-c and wo-c agreements. From both 
analysis and simulation results, we learn that the rate of improvement is 
slower in revenue gain than in quantity adjustments. Thus, battery sizes 
must be kept limited in a win-win PPA. Beyond a certain threshold, 
investing in larger battery sizes increases the revenue of the REP, but 
might not help improve the quantity adjustments (to benefit the buyer) 
any further. 
These observations lead to guidelines for structuring a win-win PPA 
(see Fig. 6). The design of such a PPA is highly dependent on whether the 
REP owns storage. If the REP does not own storage, then the price ratios 
used in the PPA can be fine-tuned to incentivize the REP to report for-
ward commitments according to the buyer’s preference for under/over 
commitment. This means that rs and re can be set according to p* (see 
Definition 3). Finally, the forward unit price cd (See Section 4.1) can be 
adjusted to make the PPA financially attractive for the REP. 
If the REP owns storage, a PPA should limit the size of storage to 
maintain financial attractiveness for the buyer. In a win-win scenario, 
storage is used to simultaneously improve the REP revenue and to align 
the REP behavior with the buyer’s preferences. If the buyer favors that 
the REP under-commits (δ ≤ 0), then a win-win PPA structure is to set 
the PPA price ratios in Zone 3 and to enforce a maximum limit on the 
battery size. Corollary 4 sheds light on what the shape and functional-
ities of such maximum allowable battery sizes are. If the buyer prefers 
that the REP over-commits (δ ≥ 0), a win-win PPA structure is to set the 
PPA price ratios in Zone 2. In this case, under a w-c agreement, there 
should be a limit on the minimum battery size, while under a wo-c 
agreement, there should be a limit on the maximum battery size. 
9. Conclusions 
Companies are actively seeking ways to reduce their carbon foot-
prints. Corporate Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), bilateral contracts 
between renewable energy producers (REP) and companies, are among 
the most convenient and popular solutions. While REPs benefit from the 
price certainty of PPAs, these contracts might bring energy production 
uncertainty to the companies. In this work, we investigated how to use 
the design flexibility of PPAs to set up a win-win strategy for buyers and 
sellers. 
We found that the parameters of a PPA can be chosen to reduce 
supply uncertainty risks to satisfy the buyer, while maintaining financial 
attractiveness to the REP. To be more precise, we first showed how PPA 
pricing and structure can affect the behavior of a profit-maximizing REP 
with and without battery storage. Then, we developed a decision tree 
that shows how to select pricing and storage limitations that will 
incentivize the REP to behave in a way that is desirable to the buyer, yet 
profitable for themselves. 
We used both simulation and analytical approaches to reach our 
conclusions. We provided a closed-form solution for a general scenario 
when the REP does not own battery storage, and under some simplifying 
assumptions when the REP owns battery storage. For the latter case, we 
apply the theory of stochastic network calculus (SNC) to model the 
behavior and the revenue of the REPs in a PPA. Our derivations showed 
that, depending on the buyer’s preferences, increasing the battery size 
can have a stronger impact on improving REP behavior to the advantage 
of the buyer than on REP profitability, with respective rates of 
Θ(log− 1(B)) and Θ(B− 1 log (B)), where B is the battery size. This suggests 
that in the presence of storage, some limitations on storage size should 
be considered in a win-win PPA structure. Our simulation studies 
confirmed this theoretical observation and further gave a more holistic 
view of the impact of different PPA pricing and structures on the revenue 
and behavior of REPs. 
This work can be extended by considering other relevant practical 
scenarios. For example, here we assumed that the REP is risk-neutral, 
only the REP owns storage, the buyer is a company (and not an en-
ergy trader), and there is one PPA. Modifying any of these assumptions 
will represent a different and perhaps another practical application and 
can be a possibility for future work.  
Fig. 6. Decision making tree for setting up a win-win PPA structure. Notation. B?: Does the REP own a battery storage? δ?: Does the buyer prefer over-commitment 
(δ ≥ 0) or under-commitment (δ ≤ 0)?, Z2, Z3, p*: pricing in Zone 2, Zone 3, and optimal pricing, B ≥ Bmin, B ≤ Bmax, B = 0: (Respectively) The battery size should be 
larger than a certain value, to be smaller than a certain value, and to be zero. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1 
We first introduce and prove the following lemma: 
Lemma A.1.1 If X is a non-negative real valued random variable, for any q > 0, we have 
E[[q − X]+ ] =
∫ q
0
ℙ(X < x)dx (22)  
E[[X − q]+ ] =
∫ ∞
q
ℙ(X > x)dx . (23)  
Proof of Lemma A.1.1. We prove the first equality (Eq. (22)). The proof of the second equality is similar and omitted due to the space limit. Let fX be the 





















ℙ(X < q − s)ds =
∫ q
0
ℙ(X < x)dx  
where we use a change of variable x = q − s in the last line. Combining Eq. (3) and Lemma A.1.1, yields 
Π = cdw − cs
∫ w
0
ℙ(W < x)dx+ ce
∫ ∞
w
ℙ(W > x)dx (24) 
Changing variable x with (1+y)W̃ and replacing W and w from Eqs. (1–2), yields 
Π = cdW̃
[
(1+ δ) − rs
∫ δ
0






Inserting this into the definition of R in Eq. (6) completes the proof. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1 
In a w-c agreement, the last term in Eq. (7) is removed and hence, 
R = δ − rs
∫ δ
− 1
ℙ(ε < y)dy (26) 








= 1 − rsℙ(ε < δ*) = 0 (27)  
which is equal to Eq. (8), accounting also for the boundary conditions − 1 ≤ δ ≤ δmax and ε ≥ − 1. In a wo-c agreement, R is given by the complete form 








= 1 − rsℙ(ε < δ*) − reℙ(ε > δ*) = 1 − re − (rs − re)ℙ(ε < δ*) = 0 (28)  
which leads to Eq. (8) considering the boundary conditions − 1 ≤ δ ≤ δmax and ε ≥ − 1 and assuming re ≤ rs. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2 
We use the buffer-battery analogy, illustrated in Fig. 2b. For a buffer with size K, the queue length qt at any time t, is given by Eq. (16), where At and 
St, are respectively, the input traffic and service rate at time t. When buffer size K is large, the buffer overflow, the amount of input traffic that must be 
dropped because the buffer is full (i.e., [At − St + qt− 1 − K]+), can be approximated by [35]: 





A(s, t) − S(s, t) − K
)]+
, (29)  




Comparing the energy deficit formulation in Eq. (17) with buffer content formulation in Eq. (16), we can map the energy storage size B to the buffer 
size K, the energy deficit bd to the buffer content q, the forward commitment w to the input traffic A, and the available energy W to the service rate S. In 
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this mapping, the energy shortage (i.e., Es, t = [wt − Wt + bt− 1d − B]+) is mapped to the buffer overflow, formulated in Eq. (29) (see Fig. 2a). Applying 






w(s, t) − W
(
s , t) − B)
]+
, (30) 
Accordingly, to make our derivation more tractable, we rewrite Eq. (47) as 




− cbE[wt − Wt]+ (31) 




to formulate Π. Given the distribution of ε from Eq. (21), we have 
E[[wt − Wt]+ ] =
W̃
2λ





is formulated in Lemma A.3.1, below. Combining Eq. (32), Lemma A.3.1, Eq. (31), and Eq. (6) with some manipulations, leads to Eq. (18) 













. (33)  






. (34)   




































> B + y
)
(35)  
where ετ is assumed to be an iid random variable at any time τ with double exponential distribution as presented in Eq. (21). Moreover, B = B
W̃ 
and y = y
W̃
. For a 




(δ− ετ) (36)  























eθ(δ− ετ− n− 1)
]
≤ Xn , (39)  
where in the second line, we used the fact that δ < 0 and ετ− n− 1 is a symmetric random variable over 0 and hence, E
[
eθ(δ− ετ− n− 1)
]
≤ 1. Using Doob’s 







≤ E[X0]e− θ(B+y) (40) 
From Eq. (36), we know that E[X0] = 1. The upper bound in Eq. (40) can be tightened by optimizing over θ, which is a free parameter. It has been 





= 1 (41)  
the upper bound in Eq. (40) will be tight enough to be used as an approximation of the right hand side of Eq. (40). Such a θ > 0, satisfying Eq. (41), 
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Replacing this in Eq. (41) and replacing eθδ by the first three terms of its Taylor’s series, yields 
1+ δθ+ δ2θ2
/
2 ≈ 1 − θ2
/









≈ e− θ(B+y) (45) 





































A.4. Proof of Lemma 2 
Under the assumption of ideal storage, and some manipulations, Eq. (15) will be reduced to 
Πt = cdwt − (cs − cb)E[wt − Wt − bt− 1]+ − cbE[wt − Wt]+ + ceE
[[
Wt − wt − bdt− 1
]+ ]
. (47) 
Inserting these revenue formulations in Eq. (6), we get the corresponding R values. 
In a w-c agreement, storing and restoring one unit of energy costs cb, but saves cs compared to the case where there is no storage. Thus, the 
necessary condition for the profitability of the storage in w-c agreements is cs > cb or equivalently rb < rs. In a wo-c agreement, each unit of energy in 
storage has been added to storage at a time when there was energy surplus beyond forward commitments of the REP. At that time, without storage, this 
unit of energy would have received ce according to the PPA. Storing this unit of energy in the storage costs cb. At a later time when withdrawn from 
storage to compensate for an energy shortage occasion, this unit of energy saves cs of the penalty with respect to a storage-less scenario. Accounting for 
all costs and revenue, the necessary condition of storage profitability in wo-c agreements is cb < cs − ce or, rb < rs − re. 
A.5. Proof of Theorem 3 























Given that δ → 0− , the last term in Eq. (49) can be approximated by − rb2λ. Moreover, assuming that B is large enough, we can ignore the third term in 
















Solving Eq. (51) for δ*, gives us Eq. (19), and this completes the proof. 
A.6. Proof of Corollary 3 
We first prove that R* and δ* are monotonically non-decreasing in B and then prove the boundary conditions: 
• Proving that R* and δ* are monotonically non-decreasing in B: 
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Please first note that B and B only differ by a positive scalar; hence, a monotonic behavior with respect to B implies the same with respect to B. In a 
w-c agreement, bt is the only parameter that varies by B in Eq. (47) and is monotonically non-decreasing in B. Thus, the REP expected revenue from Eq. 
(47) (and so is R) is non-decreasing in B since cs > cb. Since R is monotonically non-decreasing in B, so is R*, which is the maximum value of R for a 
fixed B. 
To prove the non-decreasing trend of δ* as B increases, we use contradiction. Consider two storage sizes B1 and B2 where, B2 > B1. Suppose that δ1* 
and δ2* are, respectively, the optimum quantity adjustment under B1 and B2. Also w1* and w2* are, respectively, the corresponding energy com-
mitments to δ1* and δ2* and define Δ = w1* − w2*. By the contradiction assumption, δ2* < δ1* (i.e., Δ > 0). The expected revenue of REP with B = B2 is 
larger in δ2* than in δ1*, which means that the different of expected revenue between w = w2* and w = w1* must be positive 
Π|B=B2 ,w=w*2 − Π|B=B2 ,w=w*1 = − cdΔ+ a1cbΔ+ a2(cs − cb)Δ > 0 (52)  
for some a1 and a2, where 0 < a2 < a1 ≤ 1 from Eq. (47). From Eq. (52), the difference between the expected revenues with w = w2* and w = w1*, when 
B = B1 is 
Π|B=B1 ,w=w*2 − Π|B=B1 ,w=w*1 = − cdΔ+ a1cbΔ+ a3(cs − cb)Δ > 0 (53)  
for some a3, where 0 < a2 < a3 < a1 ≤ 1 from Eq. (47). This means that with the original storage size B1, R is larger at δ2* than at δ1* and this contradicts 
the assumption and proves the claim. 
• Proving the boundary conditions: 
•B = 0: In a storage-less scenario, where B = 0, the relative expected revenue of the REP in a w-c agreement can be obtained from Eq. (8) with 
fε(x) = λ2e










Replacing this optimal commitment in Lemma 1 in a w-c agreement, we have 















•B→∞: When B is large, we have 
lim
B→∞

















































































































































and this completes the proof. 
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A.7. Proof of Corollary 4 
Denote δ and δ*, respectively, the target and the optimal quantity adjustments. Thus, we must have δ* ≥ δ. The optimal quantity adjustment of a 





> δ, then according to Corollary 3, δ* ≥ δ for any value of B and hence, the minimum storage needed is B =
0. Otherwise, the right-hand-side of Eq. (19) must be equal to the target quantity adjustment δ to find the minimum required storage size. This means 










where W− 1 is the negative branch of the Lambert W function and this completes the proof. 
Appendix B. Table of notation  
Notation Description 
cd Price per unit of energy for forward commitments ($/Wh) 
cs Penalty price for each unit of energy shortage w.r.t. the forward commitments ($/Wh) 
ce Rebate price for each unit of excess energy w.r.t. the forward commitments ($/Wh) 
cb Price of battery deficiency (per unit of energy flux) ($/Wh) 
rs Energy shortage price ratio (cs/cd) 
re Excess energy price ratio (ce/cd) 
rb Battery LCOS price ratio (cb/cd) 
wt Energy forward commitment for a future time t (Wh) 
Wt Realized available energy at time t (Wh) 
W̃t  Estimated available energy at time t (Wh) 
ε Relative estimation error 
(δt*) δt (Optimal) Quantity adjustment at time t 
p* Optimal PPA price ratio in a storage-less scenario (Definition 3) 
δtmax Maximum allowable quantity adjustment at time t 
Πt Expected overall revenue of the REP for the delivery time t ($) 
(R*) R (Optimal) expected relative REP revenue 
B (B)  Battery size in Wh (in terms of the number of time units it can store average supply) 
bt (btd) Battery (deficit) state of charge at time t (Wh) 
ηch (ηdc) Charging (Discharging) efficiency 
Ech (Edc)  Maximum charging (discharging) energy intake (output) in one time unit (Wh) 
D Depth of discharge 
Ed, t Part of realized energy used to account for the forward commitment at time t (Wh) 
Ee, t Excess energy beyond forward commitments to be taken by the buyer at time t (Wh) 
Es, t Energy shortage below forward commitments observed by the buyer at time t (Wh) 
Ec, t (Eb, t) Energy to be charged (discharged) to (from) the battery at time t (Wh) 
fε (F ε) Probability distribution function (cumulative distribution function) of ε 
PPA Power purchase agreement 
REP Renewable energy producer 
w-c (wo-c) PPA with-(without-)curtailing payment for surplus energy 
TEC True estimate commitment 
LCOS Levelized cost of storage  
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